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REASONING V. RHETORIC: THE STRANGE CASE OF
“UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT”
Hugh Spitzer*
ABSTRACT
An odd formulation has frequented American constitutional
discourse for 125 years: a declaration that courts should not
overturn a statute on constitutional grounds unless it is
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” This concept has
been thought of as a presumption, a standard, a doctrine, or a
philosophy of coordinate branch respect and judicial restraint.
Yet it has been criticized because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is
at root an evidentiary standard of proof in criminal cases rather
than a workable theory or standard for deciding constitutional
law cases. This article discusses the history and use of
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” which was
famously promoted by Harvard professor James Bradley Thayer
in 1893. The formulation never gained much traction at the
United States Supreme Court, but its use spread widely at the
state level. This analysis focuses on that state court usage,
concentrating on the past twenty years. The article presents
empirical data on the application of “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” in state supreme court decisions starting in
2000, observing that while its use is geographically random, it is
applied mostly in civil cases and overwhelmingly in opinions
upholding statutes. It shows how some state courts have picked
up the formulation and then abandoned it, while in other
jurisdictions it was absent and then suddenly appeared. Few
state court decisions have consciously analyzed whether Thayer’s
concept makes sense. But the concept continues to be used as a
rhetorical device to communicate with coordinate branches of
government and to provide institutional cover when an appellate
* Professor Hugh Spitzer teaches at the University of Washington School of Law. The
author thanks Emma Healey for her indispensable assistance in research for this article.
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court resolves a controversial case. What “unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt” does not do is serve as a working
doctrine or presumption. This article concludes—as others have
concluded—that the idea should be eliminated from judicial
discourse because it does not help judges decide cases. It can
mislead both lawyers and the public or appear disingenuous and
reduce respect for the judiciary. Consequently, courts would do
well to say what they mean and drop any pretense that
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” is a real standard.
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INTRODUCTION

A strange rhetorical formulation has persisted in American
constitutional discourse for the past 125 years: a declaration that courts
should not overturn a statute unless it is “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt.” This concept has been thought of as a presumption, a
standard, a doctrine, or a philosophy of coordinate branch respect and
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judicial restraint. But at the same time it has been critiqued by both
judges and academics because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is
fundamentally an evidentiary standard of proof in criminal cases.1 When
laws are overturned on constitutional grounds, there are often dissents,
and those dissents typically contain rational arguments; so it is odd for a
court to assert that it invalidates laws only when they are
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” in cases where dissenting
judges present reasoned contentions. Indeed, if courts applied
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” as an operative standard,
laws would be invalidated only once in a very blue moon.
Statutes are regularly declared unconstitutional by federal and state
appellate courts, but the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
language nevertheless continues to appear in opinions, at least at the
state level. Some courts that have applied the formulation have since
dropped it, and several of the courts that actively voice the concept
nonetheless ignore it when it suits them. Despite its uneven application,
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” has remarkable staying
power.
The concept goes back at least to an 1811 Pennsylvania case2 and
appeared occasionally during the nineteenth century, with a marked
increase in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries3 following
an influential 1893 Harvard Law Review article4 by James Bradley
Thayer. Thayer was a Harvard law professor with an interest in
restraining the anti-regulatory activism of the late nineteenth century
Supreme Court.5 While his teaching deeply influenced several later
Supreme Court justices,6 the Court’s opinions voiced his “beyond a
1. Strong critiques of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” include, CHARLES
L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 193–209
(1960), and, Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L.
REV. 519, 533–38 (2012). For a variety of views on the validity and impact of Thayer’s work,
see One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Thayer Centennial Symposium].
2. See Commonwealth ex rel. O’Hara v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117, 123 (Pa. 1811). In this
case, Chief Justice William Tilghman mentioned in dicta that “an act of the legislature is
not to be declared void, unless the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no
room for reasonable doubt.” Id.
3. The first instances of state court use of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” are carefully documented in, Christopher R. Green, Clarity and Reasonable Doubt
in Early State-Constitutional Judicial Review, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 169, 179–82 (2015).
4. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
5. See Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993).
6. See, e.g., Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer Upon the Work of
Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1978); Hook, supra note 5, at 7–
8; Posner, supra note 1, at 525–31; Vicki C. Jackson, Thayer, Holmes, Brandeis: Conceptions
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reasonable doubt” concept only eleven times after his article was
published, almost always in dissents from decisions invalidating
regulatory statutes.7 The single post-Thayer Supreme Court majority
opinion expressing the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
statement was issued more than six decades ago.8
However, the declaration continues to regularly appear in some state
supreme court opinions. Christopher R. Green has documented how
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” has always been
intertwined and in competition with other formulations of the basic
presumption of the constitutionality of statutes.9 While there has been
lively normative debate about Thayer’s proposition,10 no one besides
Professor Green has described in detail what state courts actually do
with the rhetorical declaration that they invalidate statutes only when
laws are unconstitutional “beyond a reasonable doubt.” There is much
more to know about how this formulation is used today in state court
cases. How often does this statement appear? In civil or criminal cases?
In cases upholding or overturning statutes? And to what extent do state
courts think about or discuss the appropriateness of “unconstitutional

of Judicial Review, Factfinding, and Proportionality, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2358–59
(2017).
7. The five pre-Thayer cases in which Supreme Court opinions voiced the concept of
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable (or rational) doubt” were: Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (Washington, J., dissenting); the Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1870); the Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878); the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127
U.S. 678, 684 (1888). The cases after Thayer’s article included: Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan &
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 699 (1895) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58,
106 (1897) (Brown, J., dissenting); Howard v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 463,
510–11 (1908) (Moody, J., dissenting); Detroit United Railway Co. v. City of Detroit, 248
U.S. 429, 442 (1919) (Clarke, J., dissenting); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287,
299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Mayflower Farms Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 278
(1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No.
1, 298 U.S. 513, 540 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 355 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Federal Housing
Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90–91 (1958).
8. See Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. at 90–91.
9. See Green, supra note 3, at 171.
10. See, e.g., Thayer Centennial Symposium, supra note 1. In an essay, Thomas W.
Merrill observed: “Discussions of Thayer’s conception of judicial review . . . tend to be
normative.” Thomas W. Merrill, Pluralism, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the Behavior of the
Independent Judiciary, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 396, 396 (1993). A concise and thoughtful
discussion of Thayer’s concept, competing understandings of that concept, and normative
debates, is found in Matthew J. Franck, James Bradley Thayer and the Presumption of
Constitutionality: A Strange Posthumous Career, 8 AM. POL. THOUGHT 393 (2019). See also
JEFFREY S. SUTTON, WHO DECIDES? STATES AS LABORATORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENTATION 58–68 (2022).
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beyond a reasonable doubt”? And does this proposition make a difference
in deciding cases?
When one carefully reviews the recent use of the concept at the state
level, several things become apparent. First, whether any particular
state’s high court voices “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
seems random. There are no regional or ideological patterns among the
jurisdictions that use it compared to those that do not. As Green
observed, most states have applied the formulation together with other
standards, particularly the clarity approach—i.e., a clear, plain, manifest
or evident instance of unconstitutionality.11 Next, remarkably few state
supreme courts have ever engaged with the concept in their opinions,
discussing and debating whether and why “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” makes sense in comparison with other formulations or
standards of constitutional review. Instead, most courts that apply the
idea appear to have picked it up without reflection, while others seem to
have dropped it without any discussion. Finally, when one reviews recent
judicial opinions where “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” has
been recited, the vast majority of them—83% in the 2000–2020 period—
have been in decisions upholding statutes, and more than three-fifths of
those have been civil rather than criminal cases.12 All of this suggests
that “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” truly is what Harvard
law professor Vicki C. Jackson labels a “rhetorical commitment[] to
judicial deference”13 and not a presumption or doctrine that drives the
outcome of cases.
This article recounts the history and use of “unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt” by state courts over the past two centuries,
concentrating on the recent period since 2000. The use of the statement
illustrates how common law courts acquire phrases from each other and
apply them when it is rhetorically useful—regardless of whether the
concept is thought through or makes jurisprudential sense. In most
states, “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” has become a jingle
that is dropped into cases when convenient (usually when upholding
statutes) and then ignored when it is not convenient. This article
concludes—as others have concluded14—that the idea should be
eliminated from judicial discourse because it does not help judges decide
cases. Quoting an evidentiary standard of proof and posturing it as a rule
of decision can mislead both lawyers and the public, or, still worse,
appear disingenuous and reduce respect for the judiciary.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Green, supra note 3, at 176–78.
See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
Jackson, supra note 6, at 2348.
See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 1, at 195; Posner, supra note 1, at 536–38.
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Part II of this article briefly reviews the history of Thayer’s concept
and later normative critiques. Part III presents empirical data on the use
of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” in state court decisions
from January 2000 to January 2020. It observes that while the
formulation’s use is geographically random, there is a clear pattern of
application, i.e., mostly in civil cases and overwhelmingly in opinions
upholding statutes. It then describes the development and inconsistent
use of Thayer’s formulation in state courts, showing how it has
sometimes been picked up and then abandoned, while in other
jurisdictions it was altogether absent and then suddenly appeared. Part
III also discusses the paucity of state court decisions consciously
analyzing whether Thayer’s concept makes sense. Indeed, thoughtful
debate over the formulation has appeared in only a half dozen states.
Part IV returns to what the concept “really” means to judges, i.e., how it
continues to be used as a rhetorical device to communicate with
coordinate branches of government and to provide institutional cover
when an appellate court resolves a controversial case by upholding a
statute. But what “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” does not
do, is serve as an honest working doctrine or presumption. This article
concludes that state courts would do well to say what they mean and drop
any pretense that “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” is a real
standard.
II. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER’S “HISTORICO-POLITICS”
James Bradley Thayer (1831–1902) was the model of an enlightened
New Englander: head of his class at Harvard Law School,15 married to
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s niece,16 president of the American Unitarian
Association,17 and a member of Boston’s Metaphysical Club, the
philosophical debating society frequented by William James, Charles
Sanders Peirce, and Thayer’s law firm colleague, Oliver Wendall Holmes,
Jr.18 Thayer contributed to progressive literary and political magazines,19
took an interest in Native Americans,20 and was active with other Boston
15. See Hook, supra note 5, at 1–2.
16. Id. at 4.
17. EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA: HOW THE AGELESS WISDOM OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS WAS INVENTED 56 (2011).
18. See Hook, supra note 5, at 4.
19. See id. at 4–5.
20. See Mendelson, supra note 6, at 71; see also Hook, supra note 5, at 7. It should be
noted that Thayer’s concern for Native American welfare led him to support policies that
today would not be seen as particularly helpful. He supported federal legislation that was
aimed, in part, at settling indigenous Americans on farms and making them more like
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intellectuals in the “Mugwump” movement of progressive Republicans
who switched to the Democratic Party.21 He was recruited onto the
Harvard law faculty by Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell and
became a distinguished teacher and a scholar on a variety of subjects.22
Thayer collaborated with Holmes on the twelfth edition of Kent’s
Commentaries,23 wrote the first casebook on American constitutional law,
and authored the first version of an important evidence treatise later
completed by his student John Henry Wigmore.24 Yet, Thayer was no
ivory-tower intellectual—he was an engaged, politically active
progressive. His article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law25 was written as a counterattack against the
activist, pro-business, and anti-regulatory majority on the United States
Supreme Court.26 In that article, Thayer attempted to demonstrate the
existence of a constitutional doctrine of judicial deference to the
legislative branch that in fact had never been consistently established or
applied. He argued that the Supreme Court would not (or at least should
not) strike down a federal statute unless it was convinced that the
legislation was “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”27 His
position relied on judicial respect for Congress as a coordinate branch,
and the presumption that lawmakers could themselves thoughtfully
consider the constitutionality of proposed bills.28
Until Thayer’s 1893 article, the concept of “unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt” had appeared spottily in American appellate court
opinions.29 In Fletcher v. Peck,30 the first Supreme Court decision
overturning a state law for incompatibility with the national
Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in 1810 that “whether a
law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution, is . . . a question of
much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the

European Americans. See WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 379
(William Draper Lewis ed., 1909).
21. Hook, supra note 5, at 6.
22. See G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW U. L. REV. 48, 60–
61 (1933); Hook, supra note 5, at 5–7.
23. Hook, supra note 5, at 4 (citing JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
(Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873)).
24. Hook, supra note 5, at 5 (citing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW (1st ed. 1904)); Mendelson, supra note 6, at 71.
25. Thayer, supra note 4.
26. See Hook, supra note 5, at 7.
27. Thayer, supra note 4, at 151.
28. See id. at 151–155.
29. See Green, supra note 3, at 179–80.
30. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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affirmative, in a doubtful case.”31 Not exactly “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt,” but the word “doubtful” is in there and it gained a
fleeting reference in Thayer’s article.32 Thayer also cited an 1811 opinion
by Pennsylvania Chief Justice William Tilghman, who had mentioned in
dicta, “that an Act of the legislature is not to be declared void unless the
violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for
reasonable doubt.”33 In 1825, Chief Justice Tilghman again stated in
dicta, “that when a judge is convinced, beyond doubt, that an act . . . [is]
in violation of the constitution, he is bound to declare it void.”34 Then in
1827, Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington wrote in Ogden v.
Saunders, that a court should “presume in favour of [a statute’s] validity,
until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable
doubt.”35 Seven years later, upholding a statute permitting the enclosure
of the Cambridge Common, Massachusetts’ Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw
voiced the concept that courts ought “never declare a statute void, unless
the nullity and invalidity of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond
reasonable doubt.”36 In the Sinking-Fund Cases, Chief Justice Waite, in
1878, said that the Supreme Court should not invalidate a statute “except
in a clear case,” when unconstitutionality is “shown beyond a rational
doubt.”37
Thayer cited these examples and a handful of other court rulings that
contained “beyond a rational doubt” or “beyond a reasonable doubt”
language.38 Thayer also mentioned several other opinions in which courts
by different language exhibited judicial deference and a hesitancy to
invalidate a law, absent a strong conviction that unconstitutionality had
been thoroughly established.39 He suggested that Chief Justice John
31. See id. at 128.
32. See Thayer, supra note 4, at 149.
33. See Thayer, supra note 4, at 140 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. O’Hara v. Smith,
4 Binn. 117, 123 (Pa. 1811)).
34. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 339 (Pa. 1825).
35. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (Washington, J.,
dissenting).
36. In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95 (1834).
37. See The Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878).
38. See Ex parte M’Collum, 1 Cow. 550, 564 (N.Y. 1823); Cotten v. Leon Cnty. Comm’rs,
6 Fla. 610, 613 (1856); Commonwealth v. People’s Five Cents Sav. Bank, 87 Mass. (5 Allen)
428, 432 (1862); Perry v. Keene, 56 N.H. 514, 519–20 (1876). All cited by Thayer. See
Thayer, supra note 4, at 142 n.1.
39. See Thayer, supra note 4, at 141 (“[W]hen it remains doubtful whether the
legislature have or have not trespassed on the constitution, a conflict ought to be avoided.”
(quoting John E. Hall, Georgia: Liberty County Superior Court, 2 AM. L.J. 93, 96–97 (1809)
(reporting opinion in Grimball v. Ross))). Thayer also quotes from a lawyer’s argument in
an earlier phase of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, a case in which that
advocate called for “absolute certainty” that “none can doubt” before a court were to
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Marshall’s theory of judicial review, as outlined in Marbury v. Madison,
was “overpraised”40 and asserted that any rational constitutional
understanding by legislators should be treated as constitutionally
valid.41 Thayer also looked for support42 from Judge Cooley’s respected
treatise on the Constitution.43 But on examination, Cooley cannot be said
to have been a true advocate for “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” as a working standard. Instead, he promoted judicial avoidance of
unnecessary constitutional decisions,44 and a cautious policy of
overturning statutes based on “a clear and strong conviction” of
incompatibility with the Constitution.45 Importantly, Green has
documented that notwithstanding Thayer’s critique of Marbury v.
Madison, and the recitation of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” at least once in every state, all state supreme courts have voiced
approval of the Marbury approach to judicial review.46
Judicial restraint and deference to a coordinate branch are a far cry
from “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” which Thayer labeled
a “thoroughly established” doctrine.47 But a sprinkling of cases over a
century do not make a thoroughly established constitutional standard—
particularly where, as Professor Charles L. Black observed, the
reasonable doubt and rational doubt language in those cases was never
a rule that the relevant courts actually applied, i.e., “precedents deferring
to the legislative judgment where the court’s convictions were that the
statute was unconstitutional.”48 Black pointed out that if
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” were a rule of decision, we
“would expect to find a torrent of such cases.”49 But there were very few,
and in the instances cited by Thayer, “the court in each of these cases felt
and expressed a positive conviction of the constitutionality of the

invalidate a statute. See Thayer, supra note 4, at 145; Trs. Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward,
17 U.S. 518, 606–07 (1819). But Thayer did not cite the “clear and strong conviction”
language actually used in the Supreme Court’s opinion, Thayer, supra note 4, at 145,
presumably because it was a weaker standard that did not fit neatly into his argument.
40. Thayer, supra note 4, at 130 n.1.
41. Id. at 144.
42. Id. at 142 n.1, 144.
43. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (6th ed.
1890).
44. See id. at 216–19.
45. See id. at 217.
46. See Green, supra note 3, at 179–82.
47. See Thayer, supra note 4, at 140.
48. BLACK, supra note 1, at 196.
49. Id.
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statute,” and each time the language was “a mere passing remark on a
problem not before the court.”50
Black’s book was just one of several hard-hitting critiques of Thayer’s
assertion.51 G. Edward White has effectively demonstrated how Thayer
was attempting to be a proper late nineteenth century “legal scientist
doing ‘historico-politics’: employing history to prove the truth of his
normative propositions.”52 In a 2012 law review article,53 professor and
former federal appeals court judge, Richard A. Posner, authored a
forceful take-down of Thayer’s “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” concept. Posner describes how Thayer’s interest in restraining
conservative judicial activism influenced, and was used by, his colleagues
and successors like Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Bickel.54 But, he
effectively argues that Thayer’s proposition was “rhetoric [rather] than a
theory”55 and that it never caught on at the Supreme Court because it
failed to provide a constitutional standard that could help justices decide
cases.56
While there have been some academic attempts to defend or
reinterpret Thayer,57 and lively intellectual sparring about his
underlying motivations and meaning,58 the basic fact remains that in
practice, the Supreme Court never seriously entertained
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” as a working standard. As
noted above,59 after Thayer’s article, his proposition appeared in only
nine Supreme Court opinions, of which eight were dissents by justices
pleading for greater judicial respect for lawmakers.60 Regardless of their
background philosophies, the Court’s members have remained solidly in
John Marshall’s orbit—willing to invalidate a statute when a majority is
clearly convinced it is unconstitutional (and notwithstanding the
dissenters’ “reasonable doubts”). As Posner observed, none of the

50. See id.
51. See, e.g., White, supra note 22; Gary Lawson, Thayer Versus Marshall, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 221 (1993); Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269
(1993); Posner, supra note 1.
52. See White, supra note 22, at 76.
53. Posner, supra note 1, at 544.
54. See id. at 525–33; see also Mendelson, supra note 6.
55. Posner, supra note 1, at 546.
56. See id. at 535.
57. The most thorough defense of Thayer is provided by, SANFORD BYRON GABIN,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE REASONABLE DOUBT TEST 27–46 (1980). See also Mark Tushnet,
Thayer’s Target: Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 9, 11 (1993); Franck,
supra note 10, at 394.
58. See generally Thayer Centennial Symposium, supra note 1.
59. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
60. Id.
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conservatives on the U.S. Supreme Court today would say: “I think the
original meaning of the Second Amendment is that people have a right
to own guns for self-defense, and the challenged statute . . . doesn’t
permit that, but reasonable persons might disagree with my reading of
history, so I’ll vote to uphold the enactment.”61
III. THAYER IN THE STATES: THE FORMULATION LIVES ON
Although “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” has not been
seen in the Supreme Court’s vocabulary for sixty years, the formulation
has persisted in the state courts. Christopher R. Green’s study illustrates
how it first appeared in a state court—Pennsylvania in 1811—and then
made at least one appearance in nearly every other state by 1975.62
Green also documented how every state has also used a clarity standard
(clearly, plainly, or manifestly unconstitutional),63 and how the clarity
approach was earlier adopted and has been consistently dominant.64 He
concludes that the two formulations ultimately mean the same thing for
most state courts,65 i.e., “[t]o be ‘clearly and truly convinced’ is to lack any
‘reasonable doubt.’”66 Hawai’i, the last state to echo the “unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt” language, did so in a case that
simultaneously included three different formulations: “all reasonable
doubt,” “clear and convincing,” and “beyond question.”67
Green’s study focused mainly on the initial appearance and early
history of the clarity standard and “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt.”68 This article builds on Green’s work and focuses on when and
how various states have used the formulation, particularly during the
past two decades. It describes patterns of usage among the states and
looks at how little thought seems to have been put into state supreme
court choices about whether to intone the expression about
unconstitutionality “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

61. Posner, supra note 1, at 537.
62. See Green, supra note 3, at 179–82. Alaska appears to be the only state in which
the supreme court never used the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
formulation. Id. at 179.
63. See id. at 176–78.
64. See id. at 182–83.
65. See id. at 183–88.
66. Id. at 188.
67. See id. at 182, 182 n.150 (quoting State v. Kahalewai, 541 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Haw.
1975)).
68. See id. at 170–73.
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A. “Unconstitutional Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” in the Twenty-First
Century
A curious aspect of state court use of “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” is that its modern occurrence among the various states
appears random—the result of rhetorical history and unconnected to any
regional or ideological pattern.
The empirical work for this article involved searching opinions of the
highest court in every state and the District of Columbia69 for the period
of January 1, 2000, through January 31, 2020. We looked for
constitutional cases using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” formulation,
and also searched for “rational doubt” in that context. The study found
677 cases nationwide during the twenty-year period. The results were
divided between civil cases and criminal cases, and between cases
overturning versus upholding statutes on constitutional grounds.
The results are illuminating. First, there is no geographical or
regional consistency in the contemporary use of “unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt.” There is no grouping by size of population. Thirteen
state courts and the District of Columbia, scattered from Vermont down
to Texas and up to Alaska, never used the formulation during the first
twenty years of this century.70 Only fourteen jurisdictions used the
concept with relative frequency—more than twenty times in the same
period.71 Montana, with seventy-four instances, was the most frequent
user. The supreme courts of eighteen states mentioned “unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt” between one and ten times in the study
period,72 and in five states, the wording appeared between eleven and

69. The study used Westlaw for searching for court use of the target terms.
70. States not using “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” in this century
include: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Vermont. The District of Columbia has also
avoided the formulation during the past twenty years.
71. States that used “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” on more than twenty
occasions during the period of January 1, 2000, through January 31, 2020, included:
Colorado (22), Connecticut (30), Iowa (29), Minnesota (44), Mississippi (34), Montana (74),
Nebraska (43), Ohio (46), Rhode Island (25), South Carolina (22), South Dakota (21),
Washington (42), West Virginia (25), and Wisconsin (53).
72. State supreme courts that mentioned “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
between one and ten times included: Alabama (4), Arizona (2), Hawai’i (9), Idaho (3),
Indiana (7), Kansas (10), Louisiana (1), Maine (6), Massachusetts (4), Michigan (7), Nevada
(1), New Hampshire (1), New Jersey (4), New Mexico (7), New York (10), North Carolina
(7), North Dakota (7), and Tennessee (2).
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twenty times.73 Overall, a solid majority of states use the formulation
infrequently.

There appears to be no correlation between the use of
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” and the dominant political
ideology of the states—both “red” and “blue” states are represented
among both the users and non-users. The courts that frequently avail
themselves of the formulation appear to be a bit more northern as a
group, scattered mainly in a band across the top of the nation.74 The
states using the concept between one and twenty times are distributed
throughout the country, and the states altogether avoiding the concept
in the past two decades are scattered along an arc starting in Vermont,
then going southwest towards Texas and back up the west coast to
Alaska.75 Fundamentally, geographical location or region does not appear

73. State supreme courts that mentioned “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
between eleven to nineteen times included: Florida (12), Oklahoma (12), Utah (19), Virginia
(11) and Wyoming (17).
74. See supra Figure 1. Mississippi and South Carolina are the only fully southern
states that have frequently used “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
75. See id.
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to be a material indicator of a court’s preference for the “unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt” refrain.
There are, however, distinct patterns in the types and outcomes of
cases in which the formulation appears. During our twenty-year study
period, 420 were civil cases (63%), while 248 involved criminal statutes
(37%).76 This is not surprising because there are many more statutes
involving non-criminal matters of both public and private law, than there
are statutes defining crimes. Further, while 37% of the cases were in the
area of criminal law, only 28% of the decisions overturning laws involved
crimes. It is unsurprising that judges give more deference to criminal
statutes than laws involving private law or government structure and
processes.
Importantly, 564 opinions of the “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” cases (83%) involved instances in which the court
upheld a statute, while only 108 were cases in which a statute was
overturned (16%). Plausible explanations for this are discussed below.77
But it seems obvious that most judges will be more comfortable reciting,
what is on its face, a very strict “standard” when they decline to
invalidate an existing law than when they overturn a statute. As we will
see below, even courts that frequently recite “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” are fully capable of nullifying statutes when they see
fit (and typically without mention of the formulation).78 The following
table summarizes the findings regarding use of “unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt” language by state high courts from January 1, 2000,
to January 31, 2020:

76. Five cases were treated as anomalous and did not fit neatly into either a civil or
criminal category.
77. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 160–65 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1
State Supreme Court Cases Jan. 2000–Jan. 2020
Reciting “Unconstitutional Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”
Formulation
Case Category

Number
of Cases

% of Cases

Civil Cases, Upholding Statute
Civil Cases, Overturning
Statute
Total Civil Cases

342
78

51% (61% of all cases upholding)
12% (72% of all cases
overturning)

420

62%

Criminal Cases, Upholding
Statute
Criminal Cases, Overturning
Statute
Total Criminal Cases

222

33% (39% of all cases upholding)

30

4% (28% of all cases overturning)

252

37%

All Cases Upholding Statute

564

83%

All Cases Overturning Statute

108

16%

5

1%

Anomalous Cases
Total Cases

677

100%

No. of states not using formulation: 14 (incl. D.C.)
No. of states using formulation < 20 times: 14
No. of states using formulation 1–10 times: 18
No. of states using formulation 11–20 times: 5
(Totals include District of Columbia)
B. The On-Again, Off-Again Peregrinations of an Odd Formulation
Christopher R. Green has shown how “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” language has appeared at least once in almost every
state at some point in the past two centuries.79 But that formulation has
an odd history: popping up in some states and then disappearing forever;
coming into use by courts through misstatements about earlier cases or
via headnote errors; and gaining currency in the early 20th century as a
signal of a progressive, pro-regulatory stance in state courts. The most
striking thing is how few state courts have ever engaged conceptually
with “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” i.e., consciously
debating the idea and providing a thoughtful rationale for using it or not.
79.

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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This section discusses some principal aspects of the formulation’s usage,
focusing on the casual and frequently unreflective character of its
appearance (and disappearance) among the states.
1. Appearing and Disappearing
Green counted twenty-four state supreme courts using
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” language between 1811
and 1893,80 giving the lie to the suggestion by modern critics of Thayer,
that he concocted his proposed standard out of almost thin air. Charles
L. Black, for example, argued that Thayer misled readers when he
promoted “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” as an established
standard.81 Black asserted that if the formulation were an accepted
doctrine, one “would expect . . . a torrent of such cases.”82 But Black fixed
his attention on pre-1893 usage by the U.S. Supreme Court,83 not the
opinions of the two dozen state courts that had used the formulation by
the time Thayer published his article. Thayer was not as disingenuous
as Black asserted. Thayer simply argued that “unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt” was commonly used and that the nation’s high court
should treat it as a working standard, thus reducing the number of cases
in which it invalidated (often progressive) legislation.
But a fascinating thing about “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt’s” evolution, is that of the twenty-four early state users of the
jingle, one-third had dropped it entirely by the current century84—
including Pennsylvania, the state in which it first appeared.85 In fact,
nearly half of the pre-1894 state users have either discontinued it, or

80. Green, supra note 3, at 179–81. The states that used the formulation at least once
through 1893 include: Pennsylvania (1811), Massachusetts (1834), Maryland (1838), New
York (1846), Arkansas (1851), Florida (1856), Michigan (1858), New Hampshire (1859),
Connecticut (1860), California (1863), Wisconsin (1863), Missouri (1868), Iowa (1870),
Vermont (1877), South Carolina (1881), Illinoi (1882), West Virginia (1882), Colorado
(1884), Kentucky (1885), Rhode Island (1889), South Dakota (1891), Tennessee (1891),
Idaho (1891), and Nevada (1893). Id.
81. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
82. BLACK, supra note 1, at 196.
83. Id. at 197-202.
84. Those states were: Arkansas, California, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
85. See Green, supra note 3, at 179. “Unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” has
appeared in dissents in two recent Pennsylvania decisions holding mandatory sentencing
statutes unconstitutional: Commonwealth v. Omar, 981 A.2d 179, 191–92 (Pa. 2009)
(Greenspan, J., dissenting), and Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247, 267 (Pa. 2015)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have mentioned it just a handful of times in the past twenty years.86
Eight of the remaining states in which it had appeared by 1893 continued
as active users in our recent period.87 Like other states that avoid or
infrequently use “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” language,
the early user states that later dropped the formulation, adhere to
approaches that focus on a challenger’s burden to demonstrate “clear”
unconstitutionality. For example, Pennsylvania, whose appellate courts
have not articulated “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” in
majority opinions since 1958,88 in 2008, described its current approach as
follows:
A legislative enactment enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality under both the rules of statutory construction
and the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The party
challenging the legislative enactment bears a heavy burden to
prove that it is unconstitutional. The statute will only be declared
unconstitutional if it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the
constitution. Any doubts are to be resolved in favor of finding the
enactment constitutional.89
Similarly, many other early users of “beyond a reasonable doubt,”
today emphasize the burden on the statute’s challenger, or the need to
show “clear” unconstitutionality, or both. For example, Arkansas’ court
has declared: “All statutes are presumed constitutional and we resolve
all doubts in favor of constitutionality.”90 Maryland similarly emphasizes
a “strong presumption of constitutionality.”91 Kentucky’s court recently
held: “The statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the challenger of
the statute has the burden to prove it is unconstitutional.”92 Vermont
holds that laws “are presumed to be constitutional, . . . are presumed to
be reasonable, . . . [and] the proponent of a constitutional challenge has

86. See states listed supra note 84, together with Michigan (1 use), Nevada (1), New
Hampshire (1), Tennessee (2), Idaho (3), and Massachusetts (4).
87. The active users included: Wisconsin (53), Connecticut (30), Iowa (29), West
Virginia (25), Rhode Island (25), Colorado (22), South Carolina (22), and South Dakota (21).
88. The most recent Pennsylvania appellate opinion using the formulation was
Commonwealth v. Bristow, in which an intermediate appeals court declared that a statute
that “promotes the health, safety, and general welfare of the public, will not be declared
unconstitutional unless its nullity and invalidity are beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Bristow, 138 A.2d 156, 161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).
89. Jae v. Good, 946 A.2d 802, 807 n.11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
90. Ester v. Nat’l. Home Ctrs., Inc., 981 S.W.2d 91, 96 (Ark. 1998).
91. Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, 384 A.2d 748, 751 (Md. 1978).
92. Hunter v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Ky. 2019).
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a very weighty burden to overcome.”93 Missouri, another nineteenth
century user of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” language,
today uses a clarity approach with a slight hint of a doubt standard: “A
statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared
unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates some
constitutional provision.”94 Oregon applies a mixed approach, noting that
“[e]very statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all doubt must be
resolved in favor of its validity.”95 But in the same case, the Oregon court
adds the Marshallian postscript: “Although that is true, a statute in
conflict with the constitution cannot stand.”96
2. Evolution Through Misreading, Misrepresentation or
Neglect
Another phenomenon is that some states adopted the “beyond a
reasonable
doubt”
formulation
by
apparent
mistake,
by
misrepresentation of earlier caselaw, or by using the phrase while
ignoring existing cases in those states that had applied the clarity
approach. For example, several twentieth century opinions issued by
Michigan’s Supreme Court mentioned “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt,” citing earlier Michigan cases as precedent. But when
one tracks back through these earlier citations, the formulation
disappears into a netherworld of mis-citations. For example, Cady v.
Detroit, in 1939, stated the concept and cited to several earlier cases.97
But upon examination, none of those cited cases had used
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” or anything like it. Some
Michigan cases cite to a 1914 decision, Attorney General ex rel. Barbour
v. Lindsay, for the concept; but while that case’s headnote mentions
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” the formulation appears
nowhere in the opinion.98 In fact, quoting Cooley, Lindsay incorporates a
resounding affirmation of Marshall’s concept that courts “finally
determine [a] question of constitutional law.”99 It appears that judges or
their clerks were aware of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
in the doctrinal atmosphere and chose to use it, and then found the
93. Badgley v. Walton, 10 A.3d 469, 476 (Vt. 2010).
94. State v. Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Mo. 1972).
95. State v. N.R.L., 311 P.3d 510, 513 n.3 (Or. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Milwaukie Co.
of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Mullen, 330 P.2d 5, 11 (Or. 1958)).
96. Id.
97. See 286 N.W. 805, 807 (Mich. 1939).
98. See Att’y Gen. ex rel. Barbour v. Lindsay, 145 N.W. 98 (Mich. 1914).
99. See id. at 100 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION (7th ed. 1903)).
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Lindsay case’s headnote in a digest without bothering to read the original
cited opinion.100
In Nevada, a recent case voices the formulation101 but neglects a
robust history of Nevada opinions that focused on presumption of
constitutionality and the clarity standard.102 A nineteenth century
Nevada case using the “reasonable doubt” approach to
constitutionality103 seems to have been an outlier and was never cited in
later decisions for the formulation.
The doctrinal genealogy of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” is also peculiar in Montana, the state that has most frequently
used it in the past twenty years (seventy-four times).104 The earliest use
in that state was in 1896, in State v. Camp Sing.105 That case was
mentioned on just a few occasions in subsequent decades,106 but then
petered out as a reference citation for the concept. The contemporary
Montana cases using the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
concept cite to strings of later Montana cases, but when one tracks back
through those cases, they eventually lead to Western Ranches v. Custer
County,107 a 1903 case that doesn’t mention Camp Sing at all. Instead,
the opinion in that case uses the alternative clarity approach to
100. See Phillips v. Mirac., Inc., 685 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Mich. 2004), for a Michigan case
that uses “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” but then cites to, Taylor v. Gate
Pharmaceuticals, 639 N.W.2d 45 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Taylor v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., 658 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 2003). However, the Taylor case does not use the
formulation at all, instead adopting a clarity approach: “Statutes are presumed to be
constitutional, and courts have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its
unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” See 658 N.W.2d at 130.
101. See Miller v. Burk, 188 P.3d 1112, 1123 (Nev. 2008).
102. See, e.g., Halverson v. Miller, 186 P.3d 893, 896 (Nev. 2008) (“‘Statutes are
presumed to be valid, and the challenger bears the burden of showing that a statute is
unconstitutional.’ The presumption, however, is rebutted when the challenger clearly
shows the statute’s invalidity.” (quoting Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339, 345 (Nev.
2006))); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. Draney, 530 P.2d 108, 112 (Nev. 1974) (“Every
reasonable presumption must be indulged in support of the controverted statute with any
doubts being resolved against the challenging party, who has the substantial burden of
showing that the act is constitutionally unsound.”); Ex parte Iratacable, 30 P.2d 284, 287,
290–91 (Nev. 1934) (“It is not only our duty to indulge every presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of the act in question, but to be loath to override an act so wholesome and
beneficent as the present one.”).
103. State ex rel. Mack v. Torreyson, 34 P. 870, 871 (Nev. 1893). Torreyson is cited in a
1948 case that mentions resolving doubts in favor of constitutionality, but not for that
proposition. See King v. Bd. of Regents, 200 P.2d 221, 225–26 (Nev. 1948).
104. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
105. See 44 P. 516, 517 (Mont. 1896); see also Green, supra note 3, at 180–81 n.128.
106. See, e.g., State v. Clancy, 52 P. 267, 267 (Mont. 1898); State v. Stewart, 190 P. 129,
132 (Mont. 1920); State ex rel. Pierce v. Gowdy, 203 P. 1115, 1117 (Mont. 1922).
107. See 72 P. 659 (Mont. 1903).
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constitutional review of statutes, i.e., that “courts will not pronounce a
statute unconstitutional unless it is clearly so, and both the statutes and
the constitutional provisions with which they are claimed to be in conflict
will be liberally construed with a view to sustaining legislative action.”108
This suggests sloppy research and opinion drafting. It also indicates that
Montana justices have acted in a loose fashion, inserting
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” when they wish to signal
deference to legislators, without thoughtfully considering the doctrinal
history or justification for the “standard” they apply. Indeed, the only
contemporary reference to Montana’s Camp Sing case in this context
appears in a 2007 concurring opinion in which a justice writes:
I . . . find this to be an incongruous standard to apply to the
proving of a legal proposition as opposed to an issue of fact. I
agree with the New York Federal District Court’s observation
that the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is an ‘absurd
standard of decision’ for a question of law.109
3. Progressive Era Expansion
Twenty-five state supreme courts mentioned “unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt” for the first time after 1893, the publication
year of Thayer’s article.110 All but two of those—Oregon (1933) and
Hawai’i (1975)111—appeared between the late 1890s and the early 1920s,
a period of progressive activism and growth in government regulation of
the private sector.112 When one examines these Progressive Era
decisions, twenty-one of twenty-three states upheld statutes and most
108. Id. at 661.
109. See Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2007 MT 293, ¶ 34, 339 Mont. 519, 171 P.3d 715
(Leaphart, J., concurring). Another case, Powder River City v. State, 2002 MT 259, 312
Mont. 198, 60 P.3d 357, cites to Camp Sing in regard to taxation on coal and mining.
110. Green, supra note 3, at 179–82.
111. See id. at 182. The twenty-three states to first mention “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” during the Progressive Era were: North Carolina (1885), Indiana (1886),
Montana (1886), Minnesota (1886), Delaware (1899), Maine (1899), Nebraska (1900),
Georgia (1902), Texas (1903), Washington (1904), Mississippi (1906), Alabama (1908), Utah
(1908), Louisiana (1908), Oklahoma (1909), New Jersey (1910), Kansas (1912), North
Dakota (1914), Ohio (1915), Virginia (1918), Arizona (1921), Wyoming (1923), and New
Mexico (1925). See id. at 180–182.
112. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R.
(1955) (examining the Populist-Progressive thinking that occurred from 1890 to 1917);
GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
HISTORY, 1900–1916 (1963) (arguing that the Progressive Era reform was brought about
by business control over politics); LEWIS L. GOULD, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Lewis L. Gould
ed., 1974) (scrutinizing the Populist-Progressive era from the 1890s to the end of World War
I).
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involved regulatory measures that Thayer would have liked judges to
respect rather than reject.113 This suggests that Thayer’s arguments
about judicial deference to elected legislative bodies had gained some
traction—or at least that Thayer’s progressive ideas correlated with a
broader judicial consensus that was already developing in that era.114 It
is important to observe that in these post-1893 instances of the first uses
of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” the courts in more than
90% of those cases upheld statutes, a proportion that is similar to the
84% of the twenty-first century cases that mention the formulation.115
Courts appear much less likely to bring up the concept when overturning
a law, so that they are not treating “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable

113. See Sutton v. Phillips, 21 S.E. 968, 968 (N.C. 1895) (upholding weights and
measures regulation); State v. Gerhardt, 44 N.E. 469, 475–77 (Ind. 1896) (upholding liquor
regulation); State v. Camp Sing, 44 P. 516, 522 (Mont. 1896) (upholding a business license
tax); Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 68 N.W. 53, 57 (Minn. 1896) (upholding jury
selection process); Wilmington v. Ewing, 43 A. 305, 309 (Del. 1899) (upholding limits on city
tort liability); State v. Lubee, 45 A. 520, 522 (Me. 1899) (upholding fisheries regulations);
State v. Standard Oil Co., 84 N.W. 413, 413–14 (Neb. 1900) (upholding anti-trust
legislation); Park v. Candler, 40 S.E. 523, 526 (Ga. 1902) (upholding law allocating proceeds
of state property sales to debt); Brown v. City of Galveston, 75 S.W. 488, 497 (Tex. 1903)
(upholding local license taxes); State v. Ide, 77 P. 961, 965 (Wash. 1904) (overturning nonuniform taxes); State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, 40 So. 152, 159 (Miss. 1906) (upholding state
prison labor statute); State ex rel. Woodward v. Skeggs, 46 So. 268, 273 (Ala. 1908)
(upholding county liquor regulations); Blackrock Copper Mining & Milling Co. v. Tingey,
98 P. 180, 186 (Utah 1908) (upholding license taxes); State ex rel. Lebauve v. Michel, 46 So.
430, 436 (La. 1908) (upholding election law); Rakowski v. Wagoner, 103 P. 632, 634 (Okla.
1909) (upholding statute on court locations); Booth v. McGuiness, 75 A. 455, 467 (N.J. 1910)
(overturning civil service law); State v. Sherow, 123 P. 866, 867 (Kan. 1912) (upholding
statute on local pool hall regulations); State ex rel. McCue v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 145 N.W. 135,
160 (N.D. 1914) (upholding railroad rate regulation); Miami County v. City of Dayton, 110
N.E. 726, 732 (Ohio 1915) (upholding land conservation law); City of Roanoke v. Elliott, 96
S.E. 819, 824–26 (Va. 1918) (upholding emergency clause in legislation); Smith v. Mahoney,
197 P. 704, 708 (Ariz. 1921) (overturning non-uniform tax); In re Proposed Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy Dist., 242 P. 683, 696 (N.M. 1925) (upholding land conservation law).
It should be observed that the last two state courts to use “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt,” also did so in cases upholding regulatory statutes. See Anderson v.
Thomas, 26 P.2d 60, 76 (Or. 1933) (upholding regulation and taxation of motor carriers);
State v. Kahalewai, 541 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Haw. 1975) (upholding statute regulating
intoxicants).
114. For a discussion of the impact of upper-middle-class progressive attitudes on state
court decisions in the early 20th century, see Hugh Spitzer, Pivoting to Progressivism:
Justice Stephen J. Chadwick, the Washington Supreme Court, and Change in Early 20thCentury Judicial Reasoning and Rhetoric, 104 PAC. NW. Q. 107 (2013).
115. See supra Table 1.
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doubt” as a real standard or constitutional theory that actually guides
justices in deciding cases.116
4. A Remarkable Lack of Discussion in Most States
Despite the spurt in the use of Thayer’s formulation in the thirty
years following his article’s publication, a state supreme court’s
introduction of the concept in those years has no correlation to the
frequency with which it later applied the formulation. In other words, it
is not a predicter of whether a state is more, or less, likely to mention
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” over the long term. For
example, of the twenty-three states in which the idea was first voiced
during the Progressive Era,117 four were active users post-2000,118 three
seem to have discontinued the formulation altogether,119 and in the
remaining sixteen states the usage was sporadic.120 This is consistent
with the random, geographically scattered character of state courts
voicing Thayer’s idea.
A striking phenomenon is the noticeable lack of judicial thought and
discussion about whether or how “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” meshes with the more common clarity standard, or whether
Thayer’s approach makes any sense at all. State courts either cite the few
early U.S. Supreme Court uses in Ogden and the Sinking Fund Cases, to
Massachusetts Justice Shaw in Wellington,121 to Cooley’s treatise,122 or
they pick it up from other states or seemingly out of thin air.123 As Green

116. This is Richard A. Posner’s major observation, i.e., that Thayer’s “standard” is not
a constitutional theory that helps judges “decide whether a statute or an executive action
violates the Constitution.” Posner, supra note 1, at 538.
117. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
118. Montana (74); Ohio (46); Washington (42); Mississippi (34).
119. Delaware, Georgia, and Texas. See supra notes 84, 86 and accompanying text.
120. North Carolina, Indiana, Minnesota, Maine, Nebraska, Alabama, Utah, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, New Jersey, Kansas, North Dakota, Virginia, Arizona, Wyoming, New Mexico.
See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text; see, e.g., State v. District of
Narragansett, 16 A. 901, 906 (R.I. 1889); Noble v. Bragaw, 85 P. 903, 904 (Idaho 1906);
State v. Phillips, 78 A. 283, 285 (Me. 1910); Clement v. State Nat’l Bank, 78 A. 944, 958 (Vt.
1911); City of Xenia v. Schmidt, 130 N.E. 24, 26 (Ohio 1920).
122. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Pelzer, Rodgers & Co. v.
Campbell & Co., 15 S.C. 581, 593 (1881); Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls, 16 S.W. 1045, 1046 (Tenn.
1891); Bonhomme County v. Berndt, 83 N.W. 333, 334–35 (S.D. 1900); State ex rel. Lucero
v. Marron, 128 P. 485, 488 (N.M. 1912).
123. See, e.g., Miami County v. City of Dayton, 110 N.E. 726, 728 (Ohio 1915) (“Of late
many of the courts, and especially the federal courts, have held that the conflict [between
a statute and the constitution] must be ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ . . . .”); Hartford Bridge
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observed, courts often have used it interchangeably with the clarity
approach.124 But few states have thoughtfully engaged with questions
such as the difference between “doubt” and “reasonable doubt,”125 the
difference between “reasonable doubt” and the clarity standard, or
whether it makes any sense to use a phrase rooted in a criminal
evidentiary standard to determine whether a statute is constitutional.
A handful of state supreme courts have engaged in serious discussion
of the issue, and the reasoning in their opinions is thoughtful and
elucidating. We will next review opinions in a half dozen states where
justices have taken the time to grapple with the question of whether
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” makes doctrinal sense. The
state court opinions that have addressed the formulation fall into two
groups: one reconfiguring “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
into something else; and the other consisting of opinions (including
concurrences or dissents) that debate the topic and sometimes reject the
concept altogether.
5. Reformulating the Formulation’s “Real” Meaning
Two opinions, from Utah and Wisconsin, handle the formulation by
explaining that it means something different from the evidentiary
standard. In Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead,126 Utah’s
Supreme Court addressed the distinction between “beyond a reasonable
doubt” as a criminal law standard and as a standard of constitutional
decision-making:
The City Council argues that we should uphold its practice unless
the Separationists show that the practice is unconstitutional
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” We agree with the Council that the
burden of showing the unconstitutionality of the practice is on
the Separationists. However, we do not agree that the showing
must be made “beyond a reasonable doubt” as that phrase has

Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210, 211 (1860); State v. Sherow, 123 P. 866, 867 (Kan.
1912).
124. Green, supra note 3, at 183–88. A good example is provided in West Virginia.
Tracking back through that state’s “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” citations,
one eventually comes to, Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534 (1883), where the opinion says:
“Perhaps this really means no more than we have said, that before declaring an act of the
Legislature void its unconstitutionality should be clear to our minds.” Varner, 21 W. Va. at
542.
125. Green, supra note 3, at 174 (listing nine states that simply referred to doubt in early
decisions without adding the adjective “reasonable”).
126. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
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been interpreted in the criminal law context, despite language to
that effect in Salt Lake City v. Savage. We think that the City
Council has read the Savage standard out of context and without
reference to the cases upon which it was grounded or our
decisions since then. We therefore restate the burden to be met
by one who challenges an enactment on constitutional grounds:
The act is presumed valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts
in favor of constitutionality.127
A recent Wisconsin opinion took a different approach, essentially
converting the formulation into a rhetorical flourish meant to emphasize
that the justices should have a high degree of confidence of
unconstitutionality prior to invalidating a statute. In Mayo v. Wisconsin
Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, that court wrote:
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears a very
heavy
burden
in
overcoming
the
presumption
of
constitutionality. In order to be successful, the challenger must
prove that the statute is unconstitutional “beyond a reasonable
doubt.” In the context of a challenge to a statute’s
constitutionality, “beyond a reasonable doubt” “expresses the
‘force or conviction with which a court must conclude, as a matter
of law, that a statute is unconstitutional before the statute . . .
can be set aside.’”128
As noted above, some state courts early defined “unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt” to “really” mean that the unconstitutionality
is clear. An example is a 1901 West Virginia opinion, Mayor of South
Morgantown v. City of Morgantown, where the court opined that “a court
must move with great caution in declaring an act of the legislature
unconstitutional, resolve all doubt in favor of its validity, and hold it
unconstitutional only in cases where the act is plainly and palpably
violative of the constitution.”129

127. Id. at 920 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
128. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶ 27, 383 Wis. 2d
1, 24, 914 N.W.2d 678, 689 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see
also In re Commitment of C.S., 2020 WI 33, ¶ 14, 391 Wis. 2d 35, 940 N.W.2d 875.
129. See Mayor of South Morgantown v. City of South Morgantown, 40 S.E. 15, 16–17
(W. Va. 1901); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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A recent example of a court thinking about the appropriateness of the
formulation (but then punting) is TABOR Foundation v. Regional
Transportation District,130 in which Colorado’s court wrote:
We presume a statute is constitutional, and we have long
required parties challenging the constitutionality of statutes to
prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Foundation asks us to reconsider the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard for constitutional challenges, or at least for challenges
to statutes under TABOR. It urges us to adopt a less onerous
“plain showing” standard instead. But because we conclude the
Foundation has failed to prove H.B. 13-1272 unconstitutional
under either standard, we decline to reconsider our choice of
standards today.131
Lively debate has arisen in Montana and Washington, both states
that continue to be heavy users of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt.” In Oberson v. United States Department of Agriculture,132
Montana’s Justice W. William Leaphart wrote a concurring opinion in
order to critique the formulation in detail:
I specially concur only to point out that in ¶ 22, the Court notes
that “Oberson has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
‘gross negligence’ provision in § 23–2–653, MCA (1995), is
‘overbroad,’ extends ‘beyond’ its stated purpose and fails to pass
rational basis review.” This Court has applied this “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard to constitutional challenges for over
100 years, beginning with State v. Camp Sing. The standard is
applied by many of our sister states, too numerous to cite. . . .
....
Despite this time-honored and well accepted standard of proving
unconstitutionality, I nonetheless find this to be an incongruous
standard to apply to the proving of a legal proposition as opposed
to an issue of fact. I agree with the New York Federal District
Court’s observation that the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard is an “absurd standard of decision” for a question of
law. . . .

130.
131.
132.

2018 CO 29, 416 P.3d 101 (en banc).
Id. at ¶ 15, 416 P.3d at 104 (citations omitted).
2007 MT 293, 339 Mont. 519, 171 P.3d 715.
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....
I suggest that the Court adopt a standard whereby we invalidate
a legislative enactment only upon a plain showing by the
challenger that the legislation in question lacks a rational
basis.133
Justice Leaphart appears to have been unsuccessful in bringing his
Montana colleagues along with him. But in several recent state cases, the
debate has become more heated, with a recent Washington case closely
split on the meaning and usefulness of “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt.” In Island County v. State, Justice Richard Guy, in
1998, had distinguished the concept from the criminal evidentiary
standard but seemed unable to decide what the formulation did mean.134
He mentioned several rationales: rhetorical deference to the legislature;
then a “full convinced” standard; and finally, a flat-out Marshallian
statement that the judiciary has the last word:
Our traditional articulation of the standard of review in a case
where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged is that a
statute is presumed to be constitutional and the burden is on the
party challenging the statute to prove its unconstitutionality
beyond a reasonable doubt. While we adhere to this standard, we
take this opportunity to explain the rationale of such a standard.
The “reasonable doubt” standard, when used in the context of a
criminal proceeding as the standard necessary to convict an
accused of a crime, is an evidentiary standard and refers to “ ‘the
necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in
issue.’ ”
In contrast, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used when
a statute is challenged as unconstitutional refers to the fact that
one challenging a statute must, by argument and research,
convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the
statute violates the constitution. The reason for this high
standard is based on our respect for the legislative branch of
government as a co-equal branch of government, which, like the
court, is sworn to uphold the constitution. We assume the
Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enactments
and afford some deference to that judgment. Additionally, the

133.
134.

Id. at ¶¶ 33–35, 339 Mont. at 529–30, 171 P.3d at 722–23 (Leaphart, J., concurring).
See Island County v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
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Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a
duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching
legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution.
Ultimately, however, the judiciary must make the decision, as a
matter of law, whether a given statute is within the legislature’s
power to enact or whether it violates a constitutional mandate.135
This confused approach led to a vigorous debate later in School
Districts’ Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Education v. State, in
which Washington Justice Susan Owens stated that the mantra “refers
to the fact that one challenging a statute must, by argument and
research, convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the
statute violates the constitution.”136 She reiterated that “this high
standard is based on our respect for the legislative branch,”137 and
repeated the Island County not-so-high standard, that “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” “merely means that . . . we will not strike a duly
enacted statute unless we are ‘fully convinced, after a searching legal
analysis, that the statute violates the constitution.’”138 Five justices
signed Owens’s opinion.139 But at the same time a majority signed either
one of the concurrences or the dissent—all of which attacked the
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” concept.140 Justice Debra
Stephens argued that the “‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is
unnecessary and distracting.”141 She noted an “inherent tension” between
the court’s duty to construe the state constitution and appropriate
deference to the legislature’s policy-making role, and then she engaged
in a thoughtful discussion of whether the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard was “the proper constitutional lens through which to examine
positive rights.”142 Justice Tom Chambers argued that “beyond a
reasonable doubt” should be left solely as an evidentiary burden on a

135. Island County, 955 P.2d at 380 (citations omitted). For a detailed critique of the
Washington State Supreme Court’s inconsistent and contradictory use of multiple
standards, see generally Hugh Spitzer, “Unconstitutional Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”—A
Misleading Mantra that Should be Gone for Good, 96 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2021).
136. See Sch. Dist. All. for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 244 P.3d 1, 4
(Wash. 2010) (en banc) (citing Island County, 955 P.2d at 380).
137. Id. (citing Island County, 955 P.2d at 380).
138. Id. at 5 (citing Island County, 955 P.2d at 380).
139. See id. at 1.
140. See id. at 9-10.
141. Id. at 9 (Stephens, J., concurring).
142. See id. at 9–10.
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party and that while the court should assume a statute is valid, it should
“entertain no presumptions against its validity.”143
Arizona’s Supreme Court recently took the discussion one step
further in Gallardo v. State,144 in which the justices expressly rejected
the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” formulation:
Defendants argue that in determining whether a statute is a
special law, we must apply a strong presumption in favor of its
constitutionality,
and
Plaintiffs
must
prove
its
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Although prior
cases have used similar language, it incorrectly states the
standard. Determining constitutionality is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Assessing the constitutionality of a law
fundamentally differs from determining the existence of
historical facts, the determination of which is subject to
deference. We therefore disapprove the use of the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard for making constitutionality
determinations.145
But this type of conscientious debate and reasoning is exceptionally
rare in state court decisions that recite (or reject) the idea of
unconstitutionality “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Why is this? Why do a
majority of state supreme courts continue to recite this formulation,
albeit at widely varying frequencies? Does it make any difference in how
judges decide cases, or is it principally a rhetorical device?
IV. WHAT COURTS DO—AND DON’T DO—WITH “UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT”
State supreme court use of the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” formulation is widely dispersed, but geographically and
historically random, as we have seen.146 In some jurisdictions it has
appeared fleetingly, while in others it has become a standard catchphrase
in court options—at least in opinions upholding statutes. There are
several overlapping explanations for (or at least observations about) the
formulation’s odd history. For some courts, “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” means something rather different from what it says.
In many instances it seems to have evolved through common law
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 10 (Chambers, J., concurring).
336 P.3d 717 (Ariz. 2014).
Id. at 720 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See supra notes 70–74, 85–87 and accompanying text.
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borrowings without much reflection. And most of the time it serves to
provide judges with political cover, a rhetorical device meant to signal
legislators and the public. But the formulation rarely makes any real
difference in court deliberations or reasoning, and it causes confusion and
potential harm.
A. Something Different from What It Says
The state supreme courts that speak in terms of unconstitutionality
“beyond a reasonable doubt” do not really mean that they will refuse to
invalidate a statute if there is any rational argument whatsoever that
the legislation might be constitutional. If the formulation were
consistently followed as a standard or constitutional theory, then
virtually every appellate decision on unconstitutionality would have to
be unanimous (or at least the judges in the majority would have to regard
any dissenting colleagues as irrational imbeciles). The fourteen courts
that use the concept regularly147 must mean something different. Green
observed that many states have used the formulation interchangeably
with the clarity approach, i.e., a high judicial confidence that legislation
clearly violates the constitution.148 Among the states that continue to
actively voice the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” standard,
good examples of the clarity approach are provided by West Virginia149
and Wisconsin,150 and Green furnishes other historical examples.151 Some
active users of the formulation, such as Utah,152 emphasize that
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” means that the party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden of
convincing the court. But those states readily concede that the statement
is quite different from the criminal evidence standard of proof of
culpability.153

147. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
150. See Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶ 27, 383 Wis.
2d 1, 24, 914 N.W.2d 678, 689 (stating that the formulation “expresses the ‘force or
conviction with which a court must conclude, as a matter of law, that a statute is
unconstitutional . . . .’” (quoting League of Women Voters v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, ¶ 17, 357
Wis.2d 360, 371, 851 N.W.2d 302, 308)).
151. See Green, supra note 3, at 183–88, 185 n.186, 186 n.188.
152. See Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993).
153. See, e.g., Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 920; Island County v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 380
(Wash. 1998) (en banc).
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B. Common Law Courts Are Borrowers (for Better and Worse)
One of the principal characteristics of common law adjudicating is
that judges routinely borrow from each other. Sometimes they carefully
evaluate the reasoning of another court’s opinions and thoughtfully adopt
constitutional standards. But frequently a judge who is trying to support
a decision will grab a phrase from a prior case, or a headnote, and latch
onto a statement that sounds familiar and might help convince
colleagues—even when the borrowed phrase has not been carefully
evaluated. Such is often the case with “unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt” language, which was copied by state after state with
little or no discussion154—and often dropped later from the discourse.155
The uptick in usage of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
during the Progressive Era suggests that whether or not state supreme
courts were thinking through the formulation (mostly not), they had a
distinct reason for latching onto the concept as a symbol of their
increasing determination to defer to lawmakers’ enactment of regulatory
statutes that just a few years earlier, pro-business courts had
invalidated.156
C. Signaling Deference to Legislatures (Even When Not Deferring)
Today’s dominant use of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” appears to be as a rhetorical flourish, what Professor Vicki C.
Jackson calls a “rhetorical commitment[] to judicial deference.”157 It
enables a court, when upholding a statute ardently challenged by an
interest group or by an individual with a poignant story, to say, in
essence: “We feel for you, but we’re stuck with the statute because we can
overturn it only if it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, which
as we all know is a very rigorous standard.” This devil-made-me-do-it
device is consistent with our finding that 83% of the recent opinions in
which courts voiced the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt”
formulation were in cases upholding statutes.158 When a court mentions
the formulation but proceeds to invalidate a statute, the opinion is
signaling to legislators: “We certainly respect elected lawmakers, and
we’re very cautious about overturning a statute, but this one is clearly

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
Jackson, supra note 6, at 2348.
See supra Table 1.
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unconstitutional—beyond a reasonable doubt (which we all know is a
very rigorous standard).”
Courts can just as well emphasize the burden on challengers and the
concept that they invalidate a law only if it is clearly, plainly, or
manifestly unconstitutional—and they regularly do that.159 But
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” survives as such a useful
rhetorical tool for many state supreme courts. The conclusion that it is
an oratorical device, rather than a real standard for deciding cases, is
supported by the willingness of courts that voice the formulation when
upholding statutes to ignore it when overturning laws. As described
above, there are fourteen state supreme courts that have used
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” more than twenty times
since 2000.160 But during that period, the high courts in at least five of
them—Alabama,161
Iowa,162
Ohio,163
West
Virginia,164
and
Washington165—have on occasion invalidated statutes on constitutional
grounds without so much as mentioning the formulation.
D. What’s the Harm?
Why should we care about judges using rhetorical flourishes that
mean something different from what they say, especially when those
flourishes make no difference in case outcomes? The problem is that
contorting a familiar proof standard from criminal evidence law into a
putative constitutional theory or rule of decision, misleads both lawyers
and the public. It may in some instances be disingenuous and reduce
respect for the judiciary.
American appellate judges pride themselves on straightforward
explanations for their decisions. But some state courts voice
“unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” language followed
159. See Green, supra note 3, at 176–78.
160. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Jefferson County v. Weissman, 69 So.3d 827, 844–45 (Ala. 2011) (Stuart,
J., dissenting); King v. Campbell, 988 So.2d 969, 986 (Ala. 2007).
162. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d
206, 245–46 (Iowa 2017). For a description of Iowa’s inconsistent use of the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard, see Bruce Kempkes, Rediscovering the Iowa Constitution: The
Role of the Courts Under the Silver Bullet, 37 Drake L. Rev. 33, 46–51 (1987).
163. See, e.g., State ex rel. Espen v. Wood Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 154 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2017Ohio-8223, 110 N.E.3d 1222, at ¶¶ 23–25; State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2006-Ohio856, 845 N.E.2d 470, at ¶ 3.
164. See, e.g., State v. Hoyle, 836 S.E.2d 817, 832–34 (W. Va. 2019); Frantz v. Palmer,
564 S.E.2d 398, 404–05 (W. Va. 2001).
165. See, e.g., State v. Villela, 450 P.3d 170, 176 (Wash. 2019); State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d
621, 641 (Wash. 2018); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 258 (Wash. 2012) (en banc).
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immediately with a statement that, “never mind, the court actually
means something different,” i.e., that a statute will not be invalidated
unless it is clearly, manifestly, or convincingly unconstitutional. This
causes confusion and frustration among people who take judges at their
word. For example, a 2014 law review case note criticized the Washington
Supreme Court’s constitutional rejection of an initiative measure
relating to tax increases.166 That author seemed genuinely shocked that
the court declined to follow Thayer’s approach, arguing that based on
that court’s declaration of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the
court had a duty to harmonize the statute with the constitution if a
reasonable interpretation existed, writing that “[t]he judicial branch
must uphold the statute in light of this reasonable interpretation.”167
Next, “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt” just might be a
bit disingenuous. State supreme court justices are generally a thoughtful
and honest group of people. They invoke “beyond a reasonable doubt” to
placate disappointed challengers of statutes or, when courts overturn
laws, as a sop to legislators or voters who might be angered by judicial
nullification of an enacted law. One state supreme court justice defended
the phrase as “simply a hortatory expression” when the justices are really
saying that they respect the legislature’s role.168 But of course the court
could simply say that, without using what appears to be some kind of
constitutional theory or standard of decision.
State supreme courts have several workable alternative devices at
their disposal. These include the widespread clarity (clearly
unconstitutional) formulation,169 as well as approaches that emphasize a
presumption of constitutionality and the high burden of argumentation
placed on those who challenge statutes.170 Green has observed that courts
frequently conflate “clearly unconstitutional” and “unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt.”171 But there is nothing misleading about
“clearly unconstitutional.” And there is nothing confusing when an
appellate court states, that when reviewing a statute, it starts with a
presumption that the law is constitutional and expects a challenger to
mount a strong argument to the contrary. The bottom line is that courts
ought to say what they mean, as simply and as clearly as possible. That
166. Nicholas Carlson, Note, Taxing Judicial Restraint: How Washington’s Supreme
Court Misinterpreted Its Role and the Washington State Constitution, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
865, 866–68 (2014).
167. See id. at 888.
168. See Island County v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 393 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
169. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
171. Green, supra note 3, at 183–88.
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is an accepted precept of judicial reasoning and writing in this country—
an ideal that, with respect to the “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt” formulation, would not be difficult to achieve if justices put their
minds to it.

